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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 
The issue in this appeal is whether the termination of a 
wholesale dealer's contract for its refusal to acquiesce in an 
alleged vertical minimum price fixing conspiracy constitutes 
an antitrust injury that will support an action for damages 
under section 4 of the Clayton Act. The United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey reasoned that 
a dealer terminated under these circumstances does not 
suffer an antitrust injury unless it can demonstrate that its 
termination had an actual, adverse economic effect on a 
relevant market. After concluding that the plaintiff's 
complaint in the instant case failed to allege such an effect, 
the District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Because we 
believe the court misconstrued the antitrust injury 
requirement, we will reverse.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1331. We 
have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291 and undertake 
plenary review of the District Court's order dismissing the plaintiff's 
complaint. 
 




The plaintiff, Pace Electronics, Inc. ("Pace"), a New Jersey 
corporation, is engaged in the business of distributing 
various electronic products, including computer printers 
and related accessories. Pace purchases these products 
from manufacturers and wholesale distributors and then 
resells them to smaller retailers, who operate in the New 
Jersey and New York region. 
 
In April of 1996, Pace entered into a nonexclusive dealer 
agreement with defendant Canon Computer Systems, Inc. 
("Canon"), a California corporation. Under this agreement, 
Pace obtained the right to purchase Canon-brand ink-jet 
printers and related accessories from Canon at "dealer 
prices." In consideration for the right to purchase these 
products at "dealer prices," Pace agreed to purchase certain 
minimum quantities of the products. 
 
The dealer agreement between Pace and Canon remained 
in effect for approximately one year and three months. 
Thereafter, on July 1, 1997, Canon terminated the 
agreement with Pace on the stated ground that Pace failed 
to purchase the minimum quantities of Canon-brand 
products required of it under the dealer agreement. 
Although Pace concedes that it did not purchase the 
amount of Canon-brand products called for under the 
dealer agreement, Pace contends that it was unable to do 
so because Canon ignored its purchase orders. Pace further 
contends that Canon ignored its purchase orders because 
Pace refused to acquiesce in a vertical minimum price fixing 
agreement designed and implemented by Canon and 
defendant Laguna Corporation ("Laguna"), Pace's direct 
competitor in the New Jersey and New York region. 
 
In this connection, Pace alleges that, prior to the time it 
entered its dealer agreement with Canon, Laguna had 
entered into a similar dealer agreement with Canon. 
Additionally, Pace alleges that the agreement between 
Canon and Laguna contemplated the maintenance of a 
minimum resale price below which Laguna would not sell 
Canon-brand ink-jet printers. In support of its allegation, 
Pace asserts that after it entered into its dealer agreement 
with Canon, the president of Canon repeatedly instructed 
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Pace's president not to sell to past or existing customers of 
Laguna and not to sell Canon brand ink-jet printers at 
prices less than those at which Laguna was selling its 
products. 
 
Pace alleges that it has suffered financial losses as a 
result of its termination as an authorized Canon-brand 
dealer. Specifically, Pace avers that "[a]s a direct and 
proximate result of the actions of Defendants . . . Pace has 
suffered significant financial detriment, consisting of, but 
not necessarily limited to, lost profits. Pace's losses result 
directly and proximately from the efforts of Canon and 
Laguna to limit price competition in the market . . . for 
which both Laguna and Pace were competing." Appellant's 
App. at 77. Although these allegations of loss appear 
somewhat vague and conclusory, we accept them as true, 
as we must, for the purposes of this appeal. 
 
Pace also alleges that its termination as an authorized 
dealer of Canon-brand products has harmed competition in 
two respects. First, it contends that its termination as a 
dealer has reduced price competition in the wholesale 
market for Canon-brand ink-jet printers (an intrabrand 
market) because Laguna no longer faces price competition 
from Pace in selling these products to smaller retailers. 
Second, Pace asserts that its termination as a dealer has 
reduced price competition in the wholesale market for all 
brands of ink-jet printers (an interbrand market). In this 
connection, Pace alleges that: (1) Canon-brand ink-jet 
printers enjoy an inherent competitive price advantage over 
the ink-jet printers of other manufacturers; (2) until Canon 
permits its distributors to take advantage of this price 
advantage, other manufacturers will not attempt to reduce 
their production costs; and, (3) until an unrestrained free 
competitive market requires other manufacturers to reduce 
their production costs, the price of all brands of ink-jet 




To state a claim for damages under section 4 of the 
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. S 15, a plaintiff must allege more 
than that it has suffered an injury causally linked to a 
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violation of the antitrust laws. See Brunswick Corp. v. 
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977). In 
addition, it must allege antitrust injury, "which is to say 
injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to 
prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants' 
acts unlawful." Id. This is so even where, as in the instant 
case, the alleged acts of the defendants constitute a per se 
violation of the antitrust laws.2See also Atlantic Richfield 
Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 341 (1990). In 
applying the antitrust injury requirement, the Supreme 
Court has inquired whether the injury alleged by the 
plaintiff "resembles any of the potential dangers" which led 
the Court to label the defendants' alleged conduct violative 
of the antitrust laws in the first instance. Id. at 336; see 
also II AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, AN ANALYSIS OF 
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION P 362a. (Revised ed. 
1995) [hereinafter AREEDA & HOVENKAMP] ("The [antitrust 
injury requirement] forces . . . courts to connect the alleged 
injury to the purposes of the antitrust laws. Compensation 
for that injury must be consistent with . . . the rationale for 
condemning the particular defendant."). 
 
For example, in Atlantic Richfield, the plaintiff, an 
independent retail marketer of gasoline, brought suit 
against ARCO, an integrated oil company which sold 
gasoline to consumers through its own stations and 
indirectly through ARCO-brand dealers, claiming that 
ARCO violated section 1 of the Sherman Act by conspiring 
with its dealers to fix the maximum resale price of gasoline 
at an artificially low level. Id. at 331. Although the plaintiff 
conceded that the fixed prices were not predatory, it 
nevertheless maintained that it suffered antitrust injury, in 
the form of lost profits, as a result of the vertical maximum 
price fixing agreement between ARCO and its dealers. See 
id. at 334-35. The Supreme Court disagreed, noting that 
the plaintiff's alleged injury did not resemble any of the 
dangers which caused the Court to label vertical maximum 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Vertical minimum price fixing is, of course, per se unlawful under 
section 1 of the Sherman Act, which outlaws "[e]very contract 
combination . . . or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among 
the several states." 15 U.S.C. S 1; see also Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. 
Park. & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). 
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price fixing per se illegal in Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 
145 (1968).3 See id. at 336. 
 
In this connection, the Court identified four potential 
adverse effects of vertical maximum price fixing agreements 
which led it to label those agreements per se illegal in the 
Albrecht decision. First, it noted that a vertical maximum 
price fixing agreement might intrude on the ability of 
dealers to compete and survive " `by substituting the 
perhaps erroneous judgment of a [supplier] for the forces of 
the competitive market.' " Id. at 335 (quoting Albrecht, 390 
U.S. at 152). Additionally, the Court observed that 
" `[m]aximum prices may be fixed too low for the dealer to 
furnish services essential to the value which goods have for 
the consumer or to furnish services and conveniences 
which consumers desire and for which they are willing to 
pay.' " Id. at 335-36. Next, the Court explained that "[b]y 
limiting the ability of small dealers to engage in nonprice 
competition, a maximum-price-fixing agreement might 
`channel distribution through a few large or specifically 
advantaged dealers.' " Id. at 336. Finally, the Court noted 
that " `if the actual price charged under a maximum price 
scheme is nearly always the fixed maximum price, which is 
increasingly likely as the maximum price approaches the 
actual cost of the dealer, the scheme tends to acquire all 
the attributes of an arrangement fixing minimum prices.' " 
Id. 
 
Having identified the potential dangers which led it to 
condemn categorically vertical maximum price fixing 
agreements, the Supreme Court had little difficulty 
determining that the plaintiff in Atlantic Richfield had not 
suffered an antitrust injury. The Court noted that the 
dangers identified in the Albrecht decision focused on the 
potential adverse effects of vertical maximum pricefixing 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Albrecht's specific holding -- that vertical maximum price fixing is 
per 
se illegal -- has since been overruled. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 
U.S. 
3, 7 (1997). However, Atlantic Richfield's approach -- i.e. discerning the 
reasons that led the Supreme Court to label certain conduct a per se 
violation, and determining whether the harm suffered by the plaintiff is 
consistent with the rationale for labeling the defendant's conduct per se 
illegitimate -- remains valid and is clearly applicable to the case before 
us. 
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agreements on dealers and consumers, not competitors of 
dealers subject to such agreements. See id. The Court 
explained: "[i]ndeed, the gravamen of [the plaintiff's] 
complaint--that the price fixing scheme between[the 
defendant] and its dealers enabled those dealers to increase 
their sales--amounts to an assertion that the dangers with 
which we were concerned in Albrecht have not materialized 
in the instant case." Id. at 337. In sum, the Court 
concluded that the plaintiff had not suffered antitrust 
injury because its losses did not flow from those aspects of 
vertical maximum pricing that rendered it illegal. Id. at 337. 
 
Turning now to the instant case, we think it appropriate 
to ask whether Pace's alleged injury resembles any of the 
dangers which have led the Supreme Court to condemn 
vertical minimum price fixing agreements under the 
antitrust laws. Pace alleges that it has suffered antitrust 
injury because it was terminated as a wholesale dealer after 
it sold Canon-brand products at prices below the minimum 
resale price allegedly fixed by Canon and Laguna. Pace 
further alleges that its termination as a wholesale dealer 
has caused it to suffer lost profits because it may no longer 
obtain profits from selling Canon-brand products at "dealer 
prices." Under the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, these 
allegations suffice to establish antitrust injury. 
 
On this point, Simpson v. Union Oil, 377 U.S. 13 (1964) 
is instructive. In Simpson, the plaintiff entered into a year- 
to-year "consignment" agreement with Union Oil. See id. at 
14. Under the agreement, which was terminable by either 
party at the end of any one-year term, Union Oil required 
the plaintiff to charge a minimum retail price for gasoline. 
See id. Contrary to the terms of the agreement with Union 
Oil, the plaintiff sold gasoline below the minimum retail 
price. See id. at 15. Because he did so, Union Oil 
terminated its "consignment" agreement with the plaintiff at 
the end of the first one-year term. See id.  
 
Sometime thereafter, the plaintiff brought suit against 
Union Oil seeking damages under section 4 of the Clayton 
Act. See id. After two pretrial hearings, the District Court 
granted summary judgment in favor of Union Oil, holding 
that the plaintiff failed to establish a violation of section 1 
of the Sherman Act and that, even assuming the plaintiff 
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had established a violation, the plaintiff suffered no 
actionable damage. See id. at 15-16. The Court of Appeals 
affirmed on the ground that the plaintiff suffered no 
actionable wrong or damage. See id. at 16. The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari and reversed. 
 
In reversing, the Court placed primary focus on the 
consignment agreement's restriction on the ability of 
dealers such as the plaintiff to make independent, 
competitive pricing decisions. For example, the Court 
explained: 
 
       We disagree with the Court of Appeals that there is 
       no actionable wrong or damage if a Sherman Act 
       violation is assumed. If the "consignment" agreement 
       achieves resale price maintenance in violation of the 
       Sherman Act, it and the lease are being used to injure 
       interstate commerce by depriving independent dealers 
       of the exercise of free judgment whether to become 
       consignees at all, or remain consignees, and, in any 
       event, to sell at competitive prices. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 
The Court also stated: 
 
       Dealers, like [the plaintiff], are independent 
       businessmen; and they have all or most of the indicia 
       of entrepreneurs, except for price fixing. . . . Their 
       return is affected by the rise and fall in the market 
       price, their commissions declining as retail prices drop. 
       Practically the only power they have to be wholly 
       independent businessmen, whose service depends on 
       their own initiative and enterprise, is taken from them 
       by the proviso that they must sell their gasoline at prices 
       fixed by Union Oil. . . . The evil of the resale price 
       maintenance program . . . is its inexorable potentiality 
       for and even certainty in destroying competition in 
       retail sales of gasoline by these nominal `consignees' 
       who are in reality small struggling competitors seeking 
       retail gas customers. 
 
Id. at 21 (emphasis added) (footnote and citations omitted). 
 
Thus, the Supreme Court considered a restriction on 
dealer independence with respect to pricing decisions to be 
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an anticompetitive aspect of vertical minimum pricefixing 
agreements, and one that the antitrust laws have an 
interest in forestalling. See Richard A. Posner, Antitrust 
Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted 
Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition 
Decisions, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 281, 289-90 [hereinafter 
Antitrust Policy] ("According to the Court in Simpson, resale 
price maintenance is bad because it benefits the 
manufacturer and oppresses the dealer by taking from the 
latter the power to price competitively."). Accordingly, we 
think that a maverick dealer, such as Pace, which is 
terminated for charging prices less than those set under a 
vertical minimum price fixing agreement, suffers the type of 
injury which the antitrust laws are designed to prevent and 
may recover damages, such as lost profits, whichflow from 
that termination. See generally AREEDA  & HOVENKAMP, supra, 
PP 382a. and 382c. (discussing dealer standing to challenge 
various vertical restraints and noting that a terminated 
dealer which "can reasonably show that he would have 
been able to profit in a market free of the illegal 
arrangements has presumably suffered both injury-in-fact 
and antitrust injury."); see also Simpson, 377 U.S. at 16 
("There is an actionable wrong whenever the restraint of 
trade has an impact on the market; and it matters not that 
the complainant may be only one merchant."). 
 
Naturally, the defendants argue that the above analysis 
misses the mark. In essence, they contend that Simpson is 
no longer good law in light of the Supreme Court's decision 
in Atlantic Richfield. Furthermore, they urge, and the 
district court agreed, that a terminated dealer seeking to 
establish that it has suffered antitrust injury must allege 
facts demonstrating that its termination as an authorized 
dealer resulted in an actual, adverse economic effect on 
competition in a relevant interbrand market. In support of 
their position, the defendants primarily rely on the 
Supreme Court's statement in Atlantic Richfield that a 
plaintiff can recover damages under section 4 of the 
Clayton Act "only if [its] loss[es] stem[ ] from a competition- 
reducing aspect or effect of the defendant's behavior." 
Atlantic Richfield, 495 U.S. at 344. On the basis of this brief 
statement, the defendants then argue that to be 
"competition-reducing" a defendant's challenged conduct 
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must have had an actual adverse effect on a relevant 
interbrand market. Although the defendants' syllogism may 
have some allure, we decline to construe the antitrust 
injury requirement as suggested by the defendants for the 
following reasons. 
 
First, we believe that requiring a plaintiff to demonstrate 
that an injury stemming from a per se violation of the 
antitrust laws caused an actual, adverse effect on a 
relevant market in order to satisfy the antitrust injury 
requirement comes dangerously close to transforming a per 
se violation into a case to be judged under the rule of 
reason. The per se standard is reserved for certain 
categories of conduct which experience has shown to be 
"manifestly anticompetitive." Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE 
Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 39 (1977). That standard, which 
is based on considerations of "business certainty and 
litigation efficiency," Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. 
Society, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982), allows a court to 
presume that certain limited classes of conduct have an 
anticompetitive effect without engaging in the type of 
involved, market-specific analysis ordinarily necessary to 
reach such a conclusion. See Business Electronics Corp. v. 
Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988) ("Certain 
categories of agreements, however, have been held to be per 
se illegal, dispensing with the need for case-by-case 
evaluation."). Were we to accept the defendants' 
construction of the antitrust injury requirement, we would, 
in substance, be removing the presumption of 
anticompetitive effect implicit in the per se  standard under 
the guise of the antitrust injury requirement.4 
 
Second, we do not believe that the Supreme Court's 
statement in Altlantic Richfield that a plaintiff can recover 
for losses only if they stem "from a competition-reducing 
aspect or effect of the defendant's behavior," Atlantic 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We recognize that various scholars have taken issue with the Supreme 
Court's per se treatment of vertical minimum price fixing agreements 
and argued that these agreements may have significant, procompetitive 
attributes. See, e.g., Antitrust Policy, 75 Colum. L. Rev. at 283. But, 
academic commentary, even if persuasive, does not permit us to expand 
the antitrust injury requirement to a point which undermines the 
Court's categorical disapproval of vertical minimum price fixing. 
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Richfield, 495 U.S. at 344, when viewed in the context of 
the Court's entire opinion, can be fairly read to require a 
terminated dealer to prove that its termination caused an 
actual, adverse economic effect on a relevant market. In 
this connection, we note that in determining that the 
plaintiff in Atlantic Richfield failed to satisfy the antitrust 
injury requirement, the Supreme Court simply did not 
focus on whether the challenged conduct of the defendant 
had an actual, adverse economic effect on a relevant 
market. Rather, as outlined above, the Court focused on 
whether the plaintiff's injury stemmed from any of the 
potential anticompetitive dangers which led the Court to 
label vertical maximum price fixing unlawful in the first 
instance. Implicit in the Court's approach is that a plaintiff 
who had suffered loss as a result of an anticompetitive 
aspect of a per se restraint of trade agreement would have 
suffered antitrust injury, without demonstrating that the 
challenged practice had an actual, adverse economic effect 
on a relevant market. See generally Daniel C. Richman, 
Note, Antitrust Standing, Antitrust Injury, and the Per Se 
Standard, 93 Yale. L.J. 1309, 1312-14 (arguing that courts 
should recognize that "each per se rule presumes a 
particular practice harms particular markets" and that 
courts should permit "only plaintiffs within those markets 
to pursue per se claims"). The issue, thus, is not whether 
the plaintiff's alleged injury produced an anticompetitive 
result, but, rather, whether the injury claimed resulted 
from the anticompetitive aspect of the challenged conduct. 
 
Finally, we point out that our holding -- that a dealer 
terminated for its refusal to abide by a vertical minimum 
price fixing agreement suffers antitrust injury and may 
recover losses flowing from that termination -- is consistent 
with the decisions of those courts which have explored the 
issue thus far. See, e.g., Sterling Interiors Group, Inc. v. 
Haworth, Inc., No. 94-9216, 1996 WL 426379 at *18-*19 
(S.D.N.Y. July 30, 1996) ("The anti-competitive dangers of 
minimum price arrangements flow to both customers who 
purchase at prices set higher than competitive levels, and 
to dealers who are effectively foreclosed from competing in 
the marketplace."). 
 




For the reasons set forth above, the district court's order 
dismissing Pace's complaint will be reversed and the case 
remanded to the district court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. Costs taxed against the 
appellees. 
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